- “Ballots and Blackmail: Coercive Bargaining and the Democratic Peace.” With Michael Poznansky. Forthcoming, International Studies Quarterly. Available here.
Dissertation: Democracies Under Fire – How Targets and Allies Respond to Coercive Threats
Abstract: When do states concede to coercive threats? While the majority of research has focused on the states initiating these challenges, comparatively little attention has been given to the targets, the states that actually face the choice of whether to stand firm or back down. My project examines the role that a target’s regime-type, broadly construed as democratic versus non-democratic states, plays in the decision-making process, arguing that democracies are more likely to concede when threatened due to the higher costs they pay for foreign policy failure and the relative ease that challengers have in identifying whether democracies are vulnerable to coercion. Further, my argument also extends to the role of democratic allies, who are less reliable when threats of violence are employed against their protègès. I employ in-depth case studies, namely the Munich and Suez Crises, to demonstrate how my theory works in practice, as well as statistical analysis with data from the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) and Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) datasets to show the external validity of my claims.
- “Compelling Targets: Democratic Targets and the Decision to Concede.”
- “Creating a Balance: Great Power Politics and the Origins of European Integration.”
- “Effective Deterrent, Ineffective Defense? The Utility of Nuclear Weapons for Coercive Targets.”
- “Revealing the Hidden Flexibility of the MNL Model to Circumvent the IIA Assumption.” With Jonathan Kropko and Michael Poznansky.
- “With Friends Like These: Compellent Threats, Democratic Allies, and Concessions.”